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NOTES
THE HHS' FINAL RULE ON HEALTH CARE
FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS: EQUAL
PROTECTION NOT GUARANTEED
INTRODUCTION
Thousands of severely defective babies are born in the United
States each year.' Their births require parents, physicians, hospitals,
and society as a whole to determine when, if ever, life-sustaining treat-
ment should be withheld from these infants.2 This difficult decision has
been magnified by modem medicine's increasing ability to save or ex-
tend the lives of defective newborns.'
Despite advances in neonatal care, pediatric euthanasia frequently
occurs without public knowledge.4  Although the legal 5 and medical6
I. The number of defective infants has been estimated at 30,000 per year. See Medical Ethics.-
The Right to Survival 1974: Hearing on the Examination of the Moral and Ethical Problems
Faced with Agonizing Decision of Life and Death Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974). For tables showing the
reported incidence of selected congenital malformations by U.S. Census Region (including
Puerto lico), see CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS SUR-
VEILLANCE REPORT, 1980, issued Feb. 1982, at 3-6 (data based on 763,419 births in 955
hospitals).
2. These infants usually suffer from one of two types of congenital abnormalities. The first type
includes infants with severe physical defects resulting in permanent physical handicap or
paralysis, and sometimes mental retardation. Examples of such defects include anencephaly
(a condition in which the brain is entirely or substantially absent) and meningomyelocele
(abnormal development of the brain or spinal cord).
The second type includes permanent handicaps combined with one or more surgically
correctable physical defect. For example, an infant may suffer from Down's syndrome with
tracheo-esophogeal fistula. (Downs is a chromosomal abnormality producing varying de-
grees of mental retardation. A tracheo-esophogeal fistula is a condition that blocks the pas-
sage from the mouth to the stomach and thus prevents oral feeding.)
For a thorough discussion of these various conditions, see W. NELSON, TEXTBOOK OF
PEDIATRICS (R. McKay & V. Vaughan 10th ed. 1975); K. SWAIMAN & F. WRIGHT, THE
PRACTICE OF PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY (1975).
3. "Between 1970 and 1980, the death rate in the first 28 days of life [the neonatal period] was
almost halved, the greatest proportional decrease in any decade since national birth statistics
were first gathered in 1915." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL
ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 197 (1983). [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION]. See also Kwang-Sun Lee, Neonatal Mortality. An.Analysis of the Recent Improvement
in the United States, 70 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15 (1980).
4. Surveys show that passive euthanasia is not uncommon and that many physicians comply
with parental wishes to stop treatments for at least some abnormal infants. A. Shaw, J.
Randolph, and B. Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery. A National Survey of Pediatri-
cians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIAT. 588 (Supp. 1977); D. Todres, Pediatricians'Attitudes
Affecting Decision-Making in Defective Newborns, 60 PEDIAT. 197 (1977); and Treating the
Defective Newborn: .4 Survey of Physicians'Attitudes, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2 (1976).
"[Dloctors have long withheld lifesaving medical support from grossly malformed in-
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professions have long debated the ethics of foregoing life-sustaining
treatment for newborns,7 the issue has recently attracted unprecedented
public attention.' Perhaps the best known case was that of "Infant
Doe."
Born in April, 1982, "Infant Doe" suffered from Down's syndrome9
fants, allowing them to die at birth and often only telling the parents that their babies were
stillborn." The Hardest Choice, TIME, Mar. 25, 1974, at 84.
Infanticide, however, is nothing new. Throughout history mankind has tolerated and
even accepted its practice. Infanticide has served many different functions such as control-
ling adult sex ratios and populations; economic interests; superstition; and eliminating defec-
tive children. For a good discussion of infanticide, see V. Rosenblum & M. Budde, Historical
and Cultural Considerations of Infantcide, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEW-
BORN I (D. Horan & M. Delahoyde eds. 1982). See also Williamson, Infanticide.- An An-
thropological Analysis, in INFANTICIDE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 61 (M. Kohl ed. 1978).
5. See, e.g., Longino, Withholding Treatment From Defective Newborns: Who Decides, and on
What Criteria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377 (1983); Portels, The Elin Daniels Case. An Examina-
tion of the Legal, Medical, and Ethical Considerations Posed When Parents and Doctors Disa-
gree Whether to Treat a Defective Newborn, 18 FORUM 709 (1983); Shapiro, Medical
Treatment of Defective Newborns. An Answer to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 137 (1983); Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die, Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393
(1982); Brant and McNulty, Treating Defective Newborns. The Ethical Dilemma, 10 HUM.
RTs. 34 (1982); Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment The Emerging
Technological and Medical Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1980); Shaw, Ge-
netically Defective Children.- Emerging Legal Considerations, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 333 (1977);
Horan, Euthanasia. Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child, Death or a Treatment of
Choice 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 76 (1975); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective
Newborns. A LegalAnalysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1975); Note, Withholding Treatmentfrom
Defective Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 224 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Postmortem]; Comment, Defective Newborns. Inconsistent Application of Legal
Principles Emphasized by the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 569 (1983); Comment,
The Legacy of Infant Doe, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 699 (1982); Note, Birth-Defective Infants. A
Standardfor Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1975); Note, Euthanasia. Crimi-
nal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Strong, Defective Infants and Their Impact on Families. Ethical and Legal Consider-
ations, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 168 (1983); Koop, Ethical and Surgical Considerations
in the Care of the Newborn with Congenital Abnormalities, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDI-
CAPPED NEWBORN 89 (D. Horan and M. Delahoyde eds. 1982); Brown and McLone, Treat-
ment Choicesfor the Infant with Meningomyelocele, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED
NEWBORN 69 (D. Horan and M. Delahoyde eds. 1982); Silverman, Mismatched Attitudes
about Neonatal Death, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12 (1981); Campbell and Duff, Moral and
Ethical Dilemma: Seven Years into the Debate About Human Ambiguity, 447 ANNALS 19
(1980); Black, Selective Treatment of Infants with Myclomeningocele, 5 NEUROSURGERY 334
(1979); Lorber, Spina Boida." To Treat or Not to Treat? Selection - The Best Policy Available,
147 NURSING MIRROR 14 (1978); Diamond, The Deformed Child's Right to Life, in DEATH,
DYING AND EUTHANASIA 127 (D. Horan and D. Mall eds. 1977); McCormick, To Save or Let
Die. The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 339 J. A.M.A. 172 (1974); Duff & Campbell, Moral
and Ethical Dilemma in the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973).
7. Other professions have also discussed this issue: See, e.g., R. STINSON & P. STINSON, THE
LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983) (parents of defective infant); Paris, Terminating
Treatmentfor Newborns. A Theological Perspective, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 120
(1982) (ethicist); Boyle, Treating Defective Newborns. Who Decides? On What Basis?, 63
Hosp. PROG. 34 (1982) (philosopher); McCarthy, Treating Defective Newborns. Who Judges
Extraordinary Means?, 62 Hosp. PROG. 45 (1981) (clergy).
8. See, e.g., Lyon, Life at any Price. Are Survivors Glad to Pay?, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 10, 1983, at
14, col. 3; Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life, TIME, Apr. 11, 1983, at 68, col. 1.
9. Down's syndrome is a chromosomal abnormality that produces varying degrees of mental
retardation. See NELSON, supra note 2. Most infants with Down's syndrome do not require
any unusual medical care at birth. For the few that do, the most common problems are
gastrointestinal blockage and congenital heart defects. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra
note 3, at 203. Many of those afflicted with Down's syndrome are able to live fairly normal,




and an incomplete esophogus.' ° After considering the alternatives,"
his parents and physicians withheld treatment and nourishment. The
Indiana court upheld their decision, 2 and "Infant Doe" died while a
county prosecutor and an Indiana University law professor were pre-
paring to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court.1 3 The
case triggered nationwide debate over whether the parent's decision
was justified. 14
The debate was accelerated recently with the birth of "Baby Jane
Doe" in New York on October 11, 1983.1' Baby Jane Doe was afflicted
with mental retardation as well as multiple birth defects. 16 Her parents
decided to forego surgery and opted for a "conservative" course of
10. This condition is called tracheo-esophageal fistula. It blocks the passage from the mouth to
the stomach thereby preventing oral feeding. This condition can be corrected in most pa-
tients; 78% of patients without other anomalies survive corrective treatment. NELSON, supra
note 2, at 803-05.
1!. The parents could grant or refuse consent to life-sustaining treatment for their infant. The
delivering obstetrician recommended treatment consisting of only sedation to keep the infant
free of pain based on his opinion that the infant had no chance of having a minimally ade-
quate quality of life. In re the Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind.
Cir. Ct., Apr. 12, 1982), cert. denied sub norn. Doe v. Bloomington Hospital, - U.S. -, 104
S. Ct. 394 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Infant Doe]. Opposing that alternative, a consulting
pediatrician recommended that the infant be transferred to a hospital in Indianapolis for
immediate surgery. Id
The infant's father testified that he and his wife felt a minimally adequate quality of life
was never possible for a Down's syndrome child. Thus, they directed that medical treatment,
food, and water be withheld in accordance with the delivering obstetrician's recommenda-
tion. Id. at 3.
12. After holding hearings on the matter, the Monroe County Superior Court ordered the hospi-
tal to comply with the parents' non-treatment decision. Id The court also appointed the
Monroe County Department of Public Welfare as infant Doe's guardian for purposes of
appeal, id at 4; however, the Department declined to appeal.
On April 13, 1982, the juvenile referee pro tern, of the Monroe county Juvenile Court,
denied a petition for an order to have custody of the child taken from the parents after
finding no probable cause to suspect parental neglect. Postmortem, supra note 5, at 234. On
April 14, 1982, the Monroe County prosecutor unsuccessfully appealed both rulings to the
Indiana Supreme Court. Id at 235.
On April 15, 1982, the Monroe County Juvenile Court denied both an injunction to force
hospital officials to keep Infant Doe alive and a temporary restraining order to require the
infant's parents to provide nutrition and medical care. Id at 235 n.77.
A subsequent appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals was dismissed as moot on February
3, 1983, due to the infant's death. The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for
writ of certiorari to the Indiana Court of Appeals. Doe v. Bloomington Hospital, - U.S. -,
104 S. Ct. 394 (1983). All records other than the original Monroe County Superior Court's
original order have been sealed.
13. Postmortem, supra note 5, at 235.
14. See, e.g., The Stormy Legacy of Baby Doe.- Should the Government Try to Save Severely
Afflicted Infants, TIME, Sept. 26 1983, at 58: How can Doctors decide new life will be worth
living? Chi. Tribune, Feb. 8, 1983, at 14, col. I; Trafford, Doctor's Dilemma; Treat or Let
Die., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 1982, at 58, col. 1; Practice of Neglecting Badly
Deformed Babies Stirs Troubled Debate, Wall St. J., July 21, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Was Indiana
Couple Entitled to Allow Their Baby to Die?, Chi. Tribune, May 22, 1982, at 6, col. 1.
15. See, e.g., The Case of Baby Jane Doe, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1983, at 45-46; Whose lives are
they anyway?, TIME, Nov. 14, 1983; Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1983, at Al, col. 3; N.Y. Times,
Nov. 7, 1983, at 23, col. 4; NAT'L L. J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 6, col. 4.
16. Baby Jane Doe's defects included spina bifida with hydrocephalus, microcephaly, and other
neurological defects. Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div. 1983).
For a discussion of these defects, see Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die. Who Decides?, 7
AM. J. L. & MED. 393, 395 (1983).
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medical treatment."7 Although the Suffolk County Supreme Court or-
dered the surgery,' 8 the Appellate Division reversed after finding no
evidence that Baby Jane Doe was being deprived of adequate medical
care or that her life was in "imminent danger."' 9 The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed on procedural grounds.2 °
The federal government entered the case when the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) brought an action in the United
States District Court2' alleging that University Hospital violated sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197322 by discriminating against a
handicapped person. The HHS also alleged that the hospital violated
45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) 23 by refusing to allow the HHS access to Baby Jane
Doe's medical records. The District Court summarily dismissed the
case. 24 The court would not allow the HHS access to the records if the
hospital did not violate section 504.25 Since the hospital lacked the le-
gal right to perform the surgical procedures, 26 the court held that the
hospital did not violate section 504 by discriminating against the infant
and, therefore, denied the HHS access to her records. 27  The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.28




20. Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983).
Under section 1034 of the New York Family Court Act, the legislature assigned the primary
responsibility for initiating child neglect proceedings to child protective agencies or persons
acting at the family court's direction. In this case the procedure was initiated at the behest of
a person unrelated to the family. The court stated that to allow any person to thus bypass the
statutory requirements "would catapult him into the very heart of a family circle" to chal-
lenge the parents' responsibility to care for their children. Id at 1188. Although the court
stated there might be appropriate occasions for court action without consulting with a child
protective agency, it found no such circumstances to justify this proceeding. 1d
21. United States v. University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
22. See infra notes 47, 95 and accompanying text.
23. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c), incorporated by reference in 45 C.F.R. § 84.61, provides that the HHS
may obtain access to such records as may be pertinent to ascertain whether or not federal
fund recipients are discriminating against handicapped persons.
24. University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. at 616. The court did, however, reject defendants' claims
that (1) the suit was barred by laches, id. at 611; (2) access to the records was barred by New
York's physician-patient evidentiary privilege, id; and (3) Medicare and Medicaid do not
constitute "Federal Financial assistance" within the meaning of section 504. Id at 612. Fur-
ther, the court ruled that the entire hospital, not just its neonatal unit, was the "program or
activity" covered by the statute. Id at 612-13.
25. Id at 614.
26. The hospital lacked legal authority to perform surgery because Baby Jane Doe's parents
refused to consent to the surgery. Id
27. Id at 616.
28. United States v. University Hospital, No. 83-6343, slip op. (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1984). Although
similar issues were raised on appeal, the government alleged for the first time that the in-
fant's records were necessary to determine whether the hospital's failure to seek a state court
order overturning the parents' decision and compelling surgery was itself violative of section
504. Id at 1911. The defendants, on the other hand, argued that section 504 provides no
authority for this action. Id at 1912. Although the court assumed that the entire hospital
was covered by section 504, id at 1915, it held that the statute did not authorize the type of
investigation initiated by the HHS. Id at 1939, After reviewing the statute's legislative his-
tory, the court determined that Congress never contemplated that section 504 would apply to
treatment decisions involving defective newborns. Id at 1938. Thus, the court held that until
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These two cases are not isolated examples. Several courts have
dealt with this issue; many have reached results contrary to the Infant
Doe and Baby Jane Doe decisions. While the courts in the Infant Doe
and Baby Jane Doe cases granted priority to parental rights of pri-
vacy,29 other courts have granted priority to the defective infant's right
to life.3" This inconsistency is largely attributable to the courts' inabil-
ity to clearly define the nature and extent of the rights and interests of
the parties involved.3
For example, while the defective infant clearly has a right to life,32
commentators are split on whether these infants have a right to die. 33
Congress has spoken on this issue, it would be an unwarranted exercise of judicial power to
approve the HHS investigation. Id at 1939.
29. For example, in Infant Doe, supra note 11, the Monroe County court felt that the value of
parental autonomy outweighed the infant's right to life where "a minimally adequate quality
of life was non-existent." Letter from Judge John Baker of the Monroe County Superior
Court to anonymous person 2 (June 8, 1983)(discussing rationale of the Infant Doe decision).
The court also stated that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution had been "often
misquoted to stand for the right of life" but that its actual purpose is to protect familiar rights
from undue governmental interference. Id at 3.
See also In Re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 949 (1980). Phillip was a twelve year old Down's Syndrome child with a congenital
heart condition. Without treatment the condition would cause a gradual deterioration of the
lungs and eventual death. Phillip's parents refused to consent to surgery. The court upheld
the parents' decision and stated that the state must overcome a "serious burden of justifica-
tion" before abridging the parental autonomy presumption. Id at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
30. See, e.g., Mailer of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Bronx County Sup. Ct.
1979). Here, the parents of a newborn daughter with spina bifica and myelomeningocele
refused to consent to corrective surgery for their child. The surgery could lessen the degree
of paralysis and possibly prevent mental retardation; whereas untreated, the condition would
cause death or extensive paralysis and mental retardation. Noting that parental rights are
not absolute and that the state can exercise its parens patriae power to protect neglected
infants, the New York Court ordered treatment. Id at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967. The court
stated: "But, where, as here, a child has a reasonable chance to live a useful, fulfilled life, the
court will not permit parental inaction to deny that chance." Id, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968. "[lIt is
our function to secure to each his opportunity for '[l]ife, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness'." Id (quoting Matter of Weberlist, 79 Misc. 753, 757; 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787 (N.Y.
County Sup. Ct. 1972)).
In In re Elin Daniels, No. 81-15577FJO1, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct., June 23, 1981), the infant
suffered from spina bifida with meningomyedocele. Without surgery death was imminent.
With surgery, however, the child could live from six years to adulthood. Elin's parents con-
sistently refused to consent to any form of treatment. After the hospital petitioned the court
to order surgery, the court ruled in favor of the hospital and declared that parents do not
have a right to refuse their child potentially life-saving treatment. Id
Finally, in In re Jeff and Scott Mueller, Nos. 81J300 and 81J301, slip op. (Ill. 5th Cir.,
May 15, 1981) (order granting custody), the parents and attending physicians decided not to
surgically separate Siamese twins joined at the waist. Upon petition to the court, the court
awarded custody to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and authorized
surgery and medical treatment for the twins. The court stated that the Illinois state constitu-
tion granted the twins an "inalienable right to life" that could not be disregarded by any
"individual; professional group, legal, medical, or otherwise . I. " ld at I.
31. The different parties include infant, parent, physician, and society in general. For an exten-
sive discussion of these rights and interests, see Longino, supra note 5, at 383-98.
32. "No person shall ... be deprived of life. . . without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The fourteenth amendment requires that states provide the same guarantee. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. In determining the extent of an infant's right to medical treatment, some commentators ar-
gue that health care providers and courts should only consider the infant's right to life. See,
e.g., Diamond, Treatment Versus Nontreatment for the Handicapped Newborn, in INFANTI-
CIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 55 (D. Horan & M. Delahoyde eds. 1982); Koop,
supra note 6, at 89. The common law "regards life itself as sacred and unalienable and
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Moreover, the parents' general right to determine their infant's best in-
terests, 34 a right which may conflict with the child's interests, 35 is pro-
tected by an expanding right to privacy.36 The U.S. Constitution fails
to resolve potential conflicts between parental and infant interests be-
cause it does not cleary delineate the extent of parents' right to pri-
vacy.37 Furthermore, although the state has the power of parens
patriae38 to protect helpless children,39 it must generally overcome a
prohibits anyone from committing suicide or licensing his own destruction." Clarke, supra
note 5, at 815.
Underlying the "right to die" view are quality of life considerations. Thus, this position
assumes that whenever the infant's potential quality of life is sufficiently low, death is prefer-
able to continued existence. For a discussion of the quality of life standard, see Longino,
supra note 5, at 395-97; Silverman, supra note 6.
34. "[T]here is a presumption, strong, but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate deci-
sionmakers for their infants. Traditional law, buttressed by the emerging constitutional right
of privacy, protects a substantial range of discretion for parents." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 212.
35. Parents can generally be expected to advance the child's best interests. Parham v. JR., 442
U.S. 584, 602 (1979). However, their willingness to promote the defective infant's best inter-
ests can be influenced by other interests such as the financial burden of caring for a defective
infant as well as the infant's effect on the family unit. For example, in one 1976 case, six
months of treatment for a premature baby cost $104,403.20. Stinson & Stinson, On the Death
of a Baby, 7 J. MED. ETHICS 5, 10 (1981). As one commentator perceptively observed:
[11f the child is treated at home, difficult and demanding adjustments must be made.
Parents must learn how to care for a disabled child, confront financial and psycholog-
ical uncertainty, meet the needs of other siblings, and work through their own con-
flicting feelings. Mothering demands are greater than with a normal child,
particularly if medical care and hospitalization are frequently required. Counseling
or professional support may be nonexistent or difficult to obtain. Younger siblings
may react with hostility and guilt, older with shame and anger. Often the normal
feedback of child growth that renders the turmoil of childrearing worthwhile develops
more slowly or not at all. Family resources can be depleted (especially if medical care
is needed), consumption patterns altered, or standards of living modified. Housing
may have to be found closer to a hospital, and plans for further children changed.
Finally, the anxieties, guilt, and grief present at birth may threaten to recur or become
chronic.
Robertson, supra note 5, at 257-58.
"Some families, however, find the experience of living through such a crisis a deepening
and enriching one, accelerating personality maturation, and giving one a new sensitivity to
the needs of spouse, siblings and others." Id. at 259. Thus, when parents consider family
interests in deciding whether to raise a defective infant, they should recognize that some
families find the experience beneficial.
36. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, n.63.
Familial privacy has received increasing protection from law throughout this century.
In the earlier stages of legal development, the source of this protection was sometimes
found in the constitutional right of religious freedom; it has gradually evolved into a
more secular protection generally referred to as the right of privacy. The substantive
core includes the authority of parents to establish family values, to set goals for the
family and for its individual members, and to make decisions affecting the welfare of
family members free from interference by agencies of the state. . . .The society as a
whole benefits from promoting diversity, and privacy law has played an increasing
role in protecting diverse life-styles and values.
For cases that established a liberty interest which was later expanded to a parental right
to privacy, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to raise a child); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents' right to control education of their children);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parents' right to direct religious upbringing of
children); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (qualified right to terminate pregnancy).
37. Postmortem, supra note 5, at 228.
38. Under the parens patriae doctrine, the state has the right and duty to act as "the general
guardian of all infants, idiots and lunatics." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 256
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strong presumption for parental freedom and authority. °
The indefinite nature and extent of the rights of the parties involved
in decisions to withhold treatment from defective infants lends confu-
sion to this issue. Extensive ethical considerations, increased public
concern, and inconsistent court decisions necessitate legislative gui-
dance to establish a framework which ensures fair and consistent
decisions.
The Federal Government has responded to this need through regu-
lation. The Department of Health and Human Services recently re-
leased its final rules concerning this complex problem. 4' Moreover,
Congress is currently considering a bill that specifically includes the
protection of handicapped infants as part of the Child Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act. u
This note contends that although the HHS rules make a major ad-
vancement in the establishment of a proper framework, they do not
represent the ideal solution. Congress must remedy the rules' short-
comings with corrective provisions by passing new legislation. This
note briefly discusses the history and substance of the final rules. It
then examines the constitutional and statutory framework of these
rules. Finally, it analyzes the final rules' various provisions and short-
comings and proposes recommendations to advance the effectiveness of
the final rules.
HISTORY OF THE HHS FINAL RULES REGARDING
DEFECTIVE INFANTS
Within a month of "Baby Doe's" death,43 the Department of
Health and Human Services' Office for Civil Rights, at the prompting
of the Reagan Administration," issued a "notice" reminding hospitals
and health care providers that withholding life-saving treatment from
defective newborns could result in the withdrawal of federal financial
(1972)(citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47). The doctrine gives states the right to
intervene and preserve the physical or mental well-being of these individuals and promote
their best interests despite the adverse interests of others. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1943).
39. [Als persons unable to protect themselves, infants fall under theparenspatriae power
of the state. In the exercise of this authority, the state not only punishes parents whose
conduct has amounted to abuse or neglect of their children, but may also supervene
parental decisions before they become operative to ensure that the choices made are
not so detrimental to a child's interests as to amount to neglect and abuse.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 212-13.
40. For example, in In re Phillip B., 42 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980), the court stated that the state must overcome a "serious burden of
justification" before abridging the parental autonomy presumption. Id at 802, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 51.
41. See infra notes 66-80, 118-52 and accompanying text.
42. S. 1003, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 54284 (daily ed. April7, 1983). See also infra
note 153.
43. See Infant Doe discussion supra notes 9-13.
44. On April 30, 1982, President Reagan issued a directive to the HHS to remind federal fund
recipients of the applicability of section 504. Interim Final Rule, infra note 48, at 9630.
19841
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assistance.45 The notice was promulgated under section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 197346 which prohibits discrimination against the
handicapped by any federal fund recipient.47
On March 7, 1983, the HHS issued an "interim final rule" stating its
intent to enforce section 504 in cases involving the denial of treatment
to handicapped newborns.4' Although these initial rules were struck
down on procedural grounds by a federal district court in April, 1983,49
the HHS issued a new "proposed rule" less than three months later.5
The new proposed rule essentially restated the initial rule. First, it
reemphasized that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohib-
its the denial of medical treatment to defective infants on the basis of
handicap.5 Second, it required hospitals to post a notice stating in
large print: "Discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped
infants is prohibited by federal law."52 Third, the proposed rule au-
thorized HHS investigation teams to promptly respond to situations ne-
cessitating immediate remedial action. 3 Fourth, hospitals under
investigation were required to provide the HHS with twenty-four hour
45. Notice to Health Care Providers, 47 FED. REG. 26,027 (1982) (notice issued May 18, 1982,
applying 45 C.F.R. § 84 to health services for handicapped children). In the notice the HHS
reminded health care providers at approximately 7,000 hospitals which receive federal assist-
ance that existing HHS regulations apply § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to health
services and treat Down Syndrome as a handicap within the meaning of § 504. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 226 n.95.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
47. Section 504 states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual .. .shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance...
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
Interpreting § 504, the notice stated:
[Ilt is unlawful. . . to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or
medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life threatening condition if:
(1) the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and
(2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically
contraindicated.
Notice to Health Care Providers, supra note 45, at 26,027.
48. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Interim Final Rule, 48 FED. REG. 9630 (1983)
(modifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.61).
49. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). The HHS
failed to issue the rule in accordance with Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.) notice
requirements found in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (d). American Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F.
Supp. at 400. Moreover, the court declared the interim final rule invalid "as an arbitrary and
capricious agency action which fails to meet the standard required under the A.P.A., 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)." Id at 399. Thus, the court ordered the HHS Secretary to invalidate the
rule. Id at 404.
50. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relation to Health Care for Handicapped In-
fants, Proposed Rule, 48 FED. REG. 30,846 (July 5, 1983) (proposed rules modifying 45
C.F.R. § 84.61) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule].
51. In clarifying its position, the HHS stated:
It is only when non-medical considerations, such as subjective judgments that an un-
related handicap makes a person's life not worth living, are interjected in the deci-
sion-making process that the section 504 concerns arise.
Id at 30,847. Thus, section 504 does not apply to "medical decisions" made by parents and
doctors to withhold treatment. Id
52. Id at 30,851.
53. Id. (proposed rule, to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(c)).
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access to hospital records and facilities.54
Unlike the interim final rule, the proposed rule established an addi-
tional requirement that state child protective agencies enact procedures
for identifying, investigating, and reporting cases involving the with-
holding of medically indicated treatment. 5  Moreover, the proposed
rule allowed a two month comment period to comply with Administra-
tive Procedure Act notice and comment requirements.56 The rule
would not become effective until HHS personnel evaluated comments
received during this period. 7
Hospital and physician groups heavily criticized the proposed
rule. 8 The American Academy of Pediatrics presented a detailed al-
ternative to the proposed rule that rejected the applicability of section
504 and suggested instead that all hospitals, as a condition of participa-
tion in the Medicare program, establish a review committee.5 9 These
committees would develop hospital policies, monitor compliance, and
review, on an emergency basis, specific cases involving the withholding
of life-sustaining treatment.6" The American Medical Association
(AMA), however, opposed any government intervention, including
government mandated hospital review boards.6' The AMA insists that
section 504 was never intended to give the HHS authority to intervene
in medical decisions.62
After receiving and analyzing approximately 17,000 comments con-
cerning the proposed rule,63 and after holding a number of meetings to
discuss the proposed rule with representatives of interested groups,'
the HHS released its "final rule" on January 12, 1984.65
The final rules are a hybrid. Like their predecessors, 66 the final
rules are promulgated under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
197367 and require hospitals to post warning notices that list a toll-free
54. Id (proposed rule, to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(d)).
55. Id (proposed rule, to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(e)).
56. The A.P.A. requires (inter alia) that notice, a comment period, and publication of the rule be
given 30 days prior to its effective date, 5 U.S.C. § 533(b)-533(d).
57. Proposed Rule, supra note 50, at 30,846.
58. See, e.g., Annas, Baby Doe Redux." Doctors as ChildAbusers, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 26
(1983); Strong, supra note 6. For other critics, see The New Right's Baby, Wall St. J., Aug. 30,
1983, at 28, col. 1; Baby Doe Needs No Big Brother, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at 20, col. 1.
59. Final Rule, infra note 63, at 1623.
60. Id
61. Baby Doe's: Children of ife or death?, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 15, 1984, at El, col. 4.
62. Id
63. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health
Care for Handicapped Infants, Final Rule, 49 FED. REG. 1622, 1623 (1984)(amending 45
C.F.R. § 84) [hereinafter cited as Final Rule].
64. Id
65. Id at 1622. Although the title to 49 FED. REG. states "Final Rule," the text uses the plural
form-"final rules." The author will use the plural form.
66. See discussion on section 504, supra notes 47, 51.
67. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1622.
In interpreting section 504, the HHS set forth the applicable standard of care in the
guidelines: "[Hlealth care providers may not, solely on the basis of present or anticipated
physical or mental impairment of an infant, withhold treatment or nourishment from the
infant who, in spite of such impairment, will medically benefit from the treatment or nour-
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number for reporting abuses.68  The notice, though, has a new head-
ing69 and need not be posted where "parents of infant patients will see
it."7 The final rules also adopt, without substantial change, the pro-
posed rules' provision that state child protection agencies establish pro-
cedures to fully utilize their authority to prevent neglect of
handicapped infants.7
The final rules have essentially eliminated the federal investigative
squads7 2 by shifting the major responsibility for policing child neglect
to hospitals and state governments. Unlike the proposed rules, 73 the
final rules provide that a hospital need not report to a state agency until
the hospital has internally reviewed a case and concluded that it should
be reported.74 Similarly, the state agencies need not report a case to the
HHS immediately," but merely on a "timely" basis.76
The final rules grant hospitals significant responsibility in policing
ishment." Id at 1653. The guidelines state that treatment which merely prolongs a defective
infants' death is not considered medically beneficial treatment. Id In determining medi-
cally beneficial treatment, the Department will respect "reasonable medical judgments." Id
Thus, section 504's effectiveness depends on the construction of "medically beneficial treat-
ment" and the allowable latitude of "reasonable medical judgment." See infra notes 109 and
139.
68. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1651. Notice A reads in part:
PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT OF DISABLED INFANTS
It is the policy of this hospital, consistent with Federal law, that nourishment and
medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical
judgments) should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of
their present or anticipated mental or physical impairments.
This Federal law, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of handicap in programs or activities receiving Federal financial
assistance. For further information or to report suspected noncompliance, call:
[Identify designated hospital contact point and temephone number] or
[Identify appropriate child protective services agency and telephone number] or
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): 800-368-1019 (Toll-free;
available 24 hours a day; TDD capability). The identity of callers will be held confi-
dential. Retaliation by this hospital against any person for providing information
about possible noncompliance is prohibited by this hospital and Federal regulations.
Cf. Proposed Rule, supra note 50, at 30,851.
69. See Notice A, supra note 68.
70. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 165 1.
71. Id Cf. Proposed Rule supra note 50, at 30,851.
72. The proposed rule encouraged a "vigorous federal role in enforcing the protections of section
504." Proposed Rule, supra note 50, at 30,846. The proposed rule also required state child
protection agencies to immediately notify the HHS Office for Civil Rights "of each report of
suspected medical neglect of a handicapped infant." Id. at 30,851. In cases where the HHS
determined that immediate remedial action was necessary to protect a handicapped infant's
life or health, the HHS could order an immediate investigation and make referrals to the
Department of Justice for the necessary legal action to save the infant's life. Id at 30,849.
These federal investigation squads were the major sore spot with physicians and hospitals.
Chi. Tribune, Jan. 15, 1984, at E-l, col. 4.
73. The proposed rules mandated that state agencies require health care providers to report "im-
mediately" to the agency any "suspected cases of medical neglect of handicapped infants."
Proposed Rule, supra note 50, at 30,851.
74. The final rules require that health care providers report to state agencies "on a timely basis
. . . circumstances which they determine to constitute known or suspected instances of un-
lawful medical neglect of handicapped infants." Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1651.
75. The proposed rules required the agencies to immediately notify the HHS Office of Civil
Rights. Proposed Rule, supra note 50, at 30,851.
76. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1651.
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infant neglect by encouraging hospitals to establish Infant Care Review
Committees (ICRC's) to oversee questions of withholding care for criti-
cally ill infants.7 7 The purpose of these committees is to assist the
health care provider in developing "standards, policies, and procedures
for providing treatment to handicapped infants and in making deci-
sions concerning medically beneficial treatment in specific cases."' 78
The rules also encourage state agencies to consult with ICRC's and to
give careful consideration to the committees' analysis and recommen-
dations.79 The final rules, however, do not require the establishment of
ICRC's.8 ° Thus, each hospital has complete discretion to determine the
committee's composition and procedure or to determine whether to es-
tablish a committee at all.
ANALYSIS OF HHS FINAL RULES
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Effectiveness of the final rules initially depends upon the constitu-
tional and statutory authority. under which the rule was promulgated.
If the rules' authority is susceptible to challenge, the rules' effectiveness
could be vitiated in one swift blow.
Pursuant to congressional authority,8' the HHS instituted rules re-
quiring federal fund recipients, namely health care providers and state
child protection agencies, to implement certain procedures for the pro-
tection of defective infants. By conditioning the receipt of federal
funds on the implementation of required procedures, the HHS is
clearly operating under the "spending power."82
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress "to lay and col-
lect taxes . . . and provide . . . for the general welfare of the United
States." 3 The Supreme Court has frequently held that this clause au-
thorizes Congress to provide financial assistance to state and local gov-
ernments "to promote the general welfare."84
77. Id This position is consistent with the recommendation by the President's Commission. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 227.
A model ICRC is set forth in the final rules. The rules call for a committee with at least
seven members including a nurse, practicing physician, hospital administrator, representa-
tive of the legal profession, representative of a disability group, a lay person, and a member
of the hospital's medical staff. Moreover, one ICRC member shall be designated to act as the
infant's "special advocate" to ensure that all considerations favoring treatment are fully con-
sidered and evaluated by the ICRC. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1652.
78. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1652.
79. Id at 1651-52.
80. Id at 1651.
81. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974,
29 U.S.C. § 706; Education of the Handicapped Act, § 606, 20 U.S.C. § 1405 as amended by
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 795; Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention,
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, § 321, 42 U.S.C. § 4581, as amended; Drug
Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 § 497, 21 U.S.C. § 1174, as amended.
82. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
83. U.S. CONST. art. VIII, § 8. This clause is known as the "spending power".
84. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
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Congress' power to provide for the general welfare is independent
from its other enumerated powers.8 5 Congress can take any action to
further the general welfare provided it does not violate some other con-
stitutional provision such as the first, fifth, or fourteenth amendments.16
Determining what furthers the nation's "general welfare" is uniquely a
congressional function. 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that
Congress has the power to condition spending of appropriated funds.88
Therefore, given such judicial deference, the constitutional limits on
the HHS's spending power, as delegated by Congress, 9 seem all but
illusory.
Arguably, however, the tenth amendment can limit congressional
spending power.9° In Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,9t the
Supreme Court set forth a procedural requirement that the Federal
Government must satisfy before it can enforce grant conditions. The
Court ruled that Congress must explicitly state its intent before impos-
ing conditions on the states through its spending power. 92 The holding
appears applicable when a federal agency has taken broad statutory
language to write restrictive rules or mandates. Since Pennhurst places
a premium on specificity, the statutory language that supposedly war-
rants these rules or mandates will be read narrowly and will be strictly
construed against the claimant.93
While it does not vitiate constitutional spending power, Pennhurst
(1936); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service
Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). For a criticism of the Court's acquiescence to Congress'
spending power, see ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN
BRIEF: THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH 15
(1980).
85. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
86. Id at 73-74. Federal grant conditions to guarantee the handicap's right to equal protection
clearly do not violate these constitutional provisions. To the contrary, the right to equal
protection is a fundamental constitutional right. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
87. In Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the Supreme Court stated: "When money is
spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by
Congress, not the states." Id at 645.
88. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Services Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See also Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
89. See list of statutes, supra note 81.
90. The Supreme Court left this possibility open in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). However, considering the Supreme Court's refusal to clarify Usery, and the una-
nimity of the lower federal courts, it is unlikely that Usery will limit federal grant conditions.
See, e.g., North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 962
(1978). For an extensive list of lower federal court decisions uniformly rejecting Usery based
claims of unconstitutionality, see CAPPALLI, FEDERAL GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREE-
MENTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE § 10:13 (1982).
91. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
92. Viewing a grant as a contract document, Justice Rehnquist held that grant conditions im-
posed by federal agencies are enforceable only if Congress clearly expressed its intent to
impose those conditions so that states can knowingly decide whether or not to accept those
funds. "Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal mon-
eys, it must do so unambiguously." Id at 17. Some commentators, however, interpret the
holding under eleventh amendment doctrine and not contract analogy. See, e.g., Baker,
Making the Most of Pennhurst's "Clear Statement Rule", 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 439 (1982).
93. CAPPALLI, supra note 90, at § 10:10.
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does require an analysis of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to determine whether the HHS reasonably construed the statute
when it created the rules designed to protect defective infants.9 4
Section 504 states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section 7(7) of this Act, shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.95
While the statute clearly creates individual rights, the specific scope of
these rights is unclear. Some commentators believe that the HHS final
rules exceed the authority granted to the Department under section
504.96 They argue that the legislative history of section 504 makes no
mention of handicapped infants, 97 that infants do not fit under the defi-
nition of "handicapped individuals,"'98 and that the statute was not in-
tended to cover medical judgments concerning the type of treatment
given any handicapped individual.9 9 Yet, reasoned authority to the
contrary indicates that the HHS acted properly under section 504.
First, section 504 was enacted to eliminate discrimination against
handicapped persons. One may reasonably conclude that decisions to
withhold treatment from infants, which are based in part on stereotypes
and prejudices concerning the quality of a handicapped individuals
life, l°" do not constitute "medical judgments"'0 ° and therefore section
504 does apply.
Second, although Congress originally defined "handicapped indi-
vidual" in vocational terms,"0 2 it realized that such a narrowly drawn
94. For an extensive discussion of section 504, see id § 20:01-20:67.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 794. This reading edits out the 1978 addition which is not relevant to this discus-
sion. Before 1978, this provision was numbered section 504. For purposes of this note, 29
U.S.C. § 794 shall be referred to as section 504.
96. See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). Al-
though the court decided the case on other grounds, it stated:
As far as can be determined, no congressional committee or member of the House or
Senate ever even suggested that section 504 would be used to monitor medical treat-
ment of defective newborn infants or establish standards for preserving a particular
quality of life .... Moreover, until the April, 1982, communication from President
Reagan the record does not reflect any official indication that the section was subject
to this interpretation during the many years it had by then already been in effect.
Id at 401. See also Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1635.
97. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1635.
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id at 1635.
101. As the final rules demonstrate, a contrary view would lead to an unacceptable result:
[Allthough the section 504 analysis may be more subtle (at least in some cases), it is an
anomalous and bizarre theory that section 504 can properly be used to require that a
ramp be built in a hospital to assure that handicapped persons not be denied access to
medical services solely on the basis of their handicaps but that statute may not prop-
erly be used to prevent the intentional act of allowing other handicapped persons to
die in that hospital. solely because of their handicaps. The Department cannot sub-
scribe to this theory.
Id.
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(b) (Supp. III 1973).
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definition detracted from the purpose of section 504 "to prevent dis-
crimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of their
need for, or ability to benefit from. . any other Federally-aided pro-
grams."' 10 3 Congress therefore enlarged the definition to include "an
person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a
record of such impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such animpairment.''l"
Given the statute's broad language, and its similarity to other Civil
Rights statutes which have been broadly construed, 0 5 section 504 au-
thorizes some departmental regulation concerning the provision of
medical care to handicapped infants. 0 6 Because defective infants have
impairments of at least some "major life activities,"' 07 they fall within
the statutory definition of "handicapped individuals."'' 0 Moreover,
since many defective newborns can benefit medically from treatment or
services, t°" these infants are "otherwise qualified"" 0 to receive that
treatment or service." '
103. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 6373,
6388.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981). The accompanying regulations further clarify the
definition of handicapped. Under these regulations:
(i) "Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the...
body systems. . . or (B) any mental or psychological disorder ...
(ii) "Major life activities" means functions such as caring for one's self, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing.
(iii) "Has a record of such an impairment" means has a history of, or has been
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities.
(iv) "Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or mental
impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by
a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) has physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments of this section but is
treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.
45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2) (1982). A "qualified handicapped person" is defined as . (4)
with respect to other services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility re-
quirements for the receipt of such services." Id § 84.3(k)(4).
105. S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978).
"The joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on H.R. 14225
(the Rehabilitation Act Amendment of 1974) stressed this parallel relationship be-
tween section 504 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and noted that applica-
tion of the provisions relating to discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color or
national origin would assure administrative due process, and provide for administra-
tive consistency within the Federal Government."
106. American Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 402.
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. Id
109. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 197. However, as the final rule states:
"Futile treatment or treatment that will do no more than temporarily prolong the act of
dying of a terminally ill infant is not considered treatment that will medically benefit the
infant." Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1653. For examples of such medically beneficial treat-
ment, see id at 1654.
110. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
111. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1636.
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Furthermore, since Medicaid and Medicare constitute federal fi-
nancial assistance, health care providers receiving these funds are pro-
grams receiving "Federal financial assistance" within the meaning of
the statute. 1 2 Defective infants are handicapped individuals otherwise
qualified to receive the benefits of federally-funded medical programs.
Thus, they are within the protection of section 504.
Third, the fact that the legislative history reveals that Congress did
not specifically mention handicapped infants in section 504 is insignifi-
cant since Congress approved section 504 with very little debate. "3 The
Senate Committee report merely repeats or paraphrases the words of
section 504.' 14
By adopting section 504, Congress simply granted equality to the
handicapped. It did not exclude any particular class of handicapped
people. A later session of Congress removed any doubt about who is
included in the coverage of section 504 by stating that the statute "was
enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals
. . . .health services."' "15 Although the Congress that enacted the
statute did not fully address the purpose and intent of section 504, this
later session of Congress was sufficiently contemporaneous with the
original enactment to reflect fairly its goals." t6
Furthermore, the current Congress approves of including handi-
capped infants within the coverage of section 504. Congress has not
objected to the promulgation of the rules under section 504, nor has it
attempted to alter the rules. Congressional acquiescence in administra-
112. For an extensive discussion concerning the status of Medicaid and Medicare as programs of
federal financial assistance, see Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1638-40. For relevant legisla-
tive history of Medicaid and Medicare, see Il1 CONG. REC. 15803, 15813 (1965).
For case precedent on the proposition that Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements con-
stitute "federal financial assistance," See, e.g., United States v. Baylor University Medical
Center, 564 F. Supp. 1495 (N.D. Tex. 1983), stay granted pending appeal, 711 F.2d 38 (5th
Cir. 1983); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978);
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978); United States
v. Cabrini Medical Center, 497 F. Supp. 95, 96 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
639 F.2d 908, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1981); Bernard B. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 528 F. Supp.
125, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1982); Flora v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 1104,
1115 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 n.21 (D.S.C.
1974), afl'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
However, on February 28, 1984, the Supreme Court gave a narrow interpretation to "pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" in Grove City College v. Bell, 52
U.S.L.W. 4283 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1984). If this narrow interpretation is extended to the receipt of
Medicaid and Medicare funds by health care providers, any direct application of section 504
to hospitals could be vitiated. The author believes, however, that the congressional intent
and long case precedent for Medicaid and Medicare constituting "Federal financial assist-
ance" precludes extension of the Grove City College rationale to this situation.
113. CAPPALLI, supra note 90, § 20:01.
Section 504 was approved without a murmur because it had no visible costs. It sim-
ply granted equality to the handicapped in federally-assisted programs, leaving the
problem and expense of implementation to grantees. So, a congressional committee
report was able to estimate a budgetary impact of zero.
114. See S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2091, 2123, 2143.
115. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 103 (emphasis added).
116. CAPPALLI, supra note 90, § 20:05.
Journal of Legislation
tive practice may be inferred from silence and presumed knowledge of
the rules as well as from failure to alter with actual knowledge of the
administrative interpretation.' 17 Hence Congress originally intended,
and continues to acquiesce in, the inclusion of handicapped infants
within sectin 504's coverage.
Therefore, the HHS has properly utilized its constitutional and stat-
utory authority in creating the final rules. As Pennhurst requires, sec-
tion 504 is sufficiently specific to authorize HHS to promulgate the final
rules.
Substantive Provisions of the Final Rules
Section 504 of the final rules essentially creates an equal-treatment,
nondiscrimination standard."'i It is not a right-to-life statute. Section
504 simply protects handicapped individuals from being treated differ-
ently than nonhandicapped individuals. The HHS final rules have the
difficult task of ensuring that this standard is adhered to when dealing
with handicapped infants. The HHS has two alternatives to properly
enforce this standard. First, section 504's standard is clearly enforced if
the HHS final rules prohibit any withholding of treatment from handi-
capped infants. Second, absent such a prohibition, the standard is en-
forced only if the rules set forth firm requirements that ensure the equal
protection of handicapped infants in withholding treatment decisions.
The HHS has opted for the latter. Unfortunately, the final rules do not
guarantee equal protection in all withholding treatment decisions.
Compared to the proposed rule," 9 the final rules seem to have
taken a step backwards in protecting handicapped infants. Whereas
the proposed rule prohibited health care providers from causing death
by starvation or dehydration, 20 the final rules do not take such a defin-
itive stance. They seem to allow at least some denial of intravenous
feeding to be decided on a case by case basis. 12 1 The final rules have
117. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); Costanzo v. Tilling-
hast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932); Long v. Dick, 87 Ariz. 25, 347 P.2d 581 (1959). Moreover, courts
generally give great weight to an agency's statutory interpretation. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
118. Proposed Rule, supra note 50, at 30,851.
119. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
120. The proposed rule stated:
At the same time, the basic provision of nourishment, fluids, and routine nursing
care is a fundamental matter of human dignity, not an option for medical judgment.
Even if a handicapped infant faces imminent and unavoidable death, no health care
provider should take upon itself to cause death by starvation or dehydration. Routine
nursing care to provide comfort and cleanliness is required to respect the dignity of
such an infant. To deny these forms of basic care to handicapped individuals would
constitute discrimination contrary to Section 504.
Proposed Rule, supra note 50, at 30,852.
121. Paraphrasing the final rule:
There are few definitive statements on the various dimensions of the applicability of
handicapped discrimination law. Hence, it would be imprudent to speculate on the outcome
of applying section 504 in a wide variety of specific factual circumstances. The law and
government cannot prospectively and unequivocally answer every hypothetical question.
Thus, in many cases, "the law, like medical treatment, can only be applied on a case-by-case
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also shifted the major responsibility for policing infant neglect from
federal agencies to hospitals and state agencies.
22
These policy changes would be of minor significance for enforce-
ment of section 504 if the final rules mandated standards and proce-
dures that guarantee defective infants equal protection in decisions
about whether to withhold life-sustaining treatment. Unfortunately,
the final rules lack mandates providing for impartial decisionmaking.
The recommendations and guidelines advancing an infant's equal pro-
tection within the decisionmaking process remain wholly voluntary.
The final rules, therefore, cannot guarantee the equal protection of
handicapped infants.
123
The mandatory aspects of the final rules "deal only with several
discreet points"'' 24 and include:
First, hospitals must post an informational notice. Second, the normal
10-day notice before initiating action to effect compliance can be
waived when immediate access is necessary. Third, access by the De-
partment to pertinent records and facilities can be obtained after "nor-
mal business hours" when immediate access is necessary. Fourth, state
child protection services agencies must establish procedures to utilize
their full authority under state law to prevent medical neglect of handi-
capped infants.1
2Z
Admittedly, these mandates are important. Ultimately, they advise
people about legal requirements concerning handicapped infant dis-
crimination, provide mechanisms for reporting section 504 violations,
ensure prompt access to medical records, 26 require "reasonable assur-
ance of compliance"1 27 with state standards, and allow for swift reme-
dial action for non-compliance. The mandates, however, have little
bearing on the critical issue of ensuring impartial decisionmaking in
denial of treatment cases.
In comparison, the voluntary aspects of the final rules can assure
basis with a full appreciation for the facts presented." Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1632.
Thus, by implication the HHS rule will allow some denials of intravenous feeding to be
decided case by case.
122. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
123. A caveat may be necessary. Since the HHS proposed these guidelines, it is fair to assume
that the HHS will follow those guidelines applicable to itself. Consequently, the HHS will
normally take the following procedure:
If a hospital has an ICRC, federal investigators, 'unless impractical,' will wait 24
hours after receiving reports of withheld treatment to allow the ICRC to consider the
case and make its analysis and recommendations. An HHS medical consultant will
contact the Committee. After receiving the Committee's report and input from the
medical consultant, the investigators will determine whether an on site visit is neces-
sary. The HHS will carefully review the complaints to prevent unnecessary on site
investigations. If an investigation is authorized, the investigators first meet with the
ICRC.
Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1631-32.
124. Id at 1628.
125. Id
126. This requirement has been successfully challenged in court. See supra notes 21-28 and ac-
companying text.
127. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1627.
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impartial decisionmaking. The final rules recommend that health care
providers establish Infant Care Review Committees (ICRC's). 128 The
purpose of such committees is to "assist the health care provider in the
development of standards, policies and procedures for providing treat-
ment to handicapped infants and in making decisions concerning medi-
cally beneficial treatment in specific cases." '2 9 The rules suggest that
these committees operate under very strict standards.'3 ° If health care
providers voluntarily implement and adhere to the recommendations
and guidelines, the final rules will offer equal protection to handi-
capped infants.
By establishing an ICRC, health care providers can improve the
ability of parents and physicians to decide whether to withhold treat-
ment from defective infants. An ICRC can ensure that the best and
most current information is available and used by parties making deci-
sions about life-sustaining treatment.' 3' For example, parents will be
fully informed of the infant's condition and prognosis and will also be
provided with names of and access to various public and private agen-
cies which provide services to infants with similar conditions. 132 This
information may afford parents and physicians a better context in
which to make treatment decisions. Moreover, an ICRC could correct
communication problems that often exist between health care providers
and parents. 133
Furthermore, an ICRC can ensure that the infant's rights and inter-
ests are fully considered. The final rules provide for a model ICRC 134
which calls for broad representation of differing backgrounds and per-
spectives within the committee's membership. 135 This broad represen-
tation will likely prevent decisions to withhold treatment from being
made solely by those parties whose interests may conflict with those of
the infants.'36 The model ICRC also designates one committee mem-
ber as "special advocate" for the infant to ensure that all considerations
favoring life-sustaining treatment are fully evaluated and regarded by
the ICRC. 37 Since a child's best interests usually depend on who de-
128. Id at 1651. This position is consistent with the recommendation by the President's Commis-
sion. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 227.
129. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1651.
130. Quoting from "Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants," the final rule states:
Consideration such as anticipated or actual limited potential of an individual and
present or future lack of available community resources are irrelevant and must not
determine the decisions concerning medical care. The individual's medical condition
should be the sole focus of the decision. These are very strict standards.
Id at 1652.
131. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 224.
132. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1653.
133. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 224.
134. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1652.
135. See Final Rule, supra note 77.
136. Parents and the infant's treating physician generally fall into this category. For a good dis-
cussion of these conflicting rights and interest, see Longino, supra note 5, at 383-92. See also
supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
137. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1653. The full consideration of the child's best interests seems
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fines what those interests are, the presence of a "special advocate" will
provide the infant with a "voice" to defend its interests against those
who might fail to take its interest into account. Moreover, the presence
of a "special advocate" can prevent a committee, which may be gener-
ally sympathetic to parents or physicians, from merely rubber stamping
parents' 138 or treating physicians'139 decisions to withhold treatment
from a defective infant.
An ICRC can also ensure appropriate review of these cases to pro-
vide full protection of the infant's interests. The rules state: "[tlhe hos-
pital will, to the extent possible, require in each case that life-sustaining
treatment be continued, until the ICRC can review the case and pro-
vide advice."' 141 Should the ICRC disagree with a family's refusal to
consent to continued treatment, the ICRC can recommend to the hos-
pital board that the case be referred immediately to an appropriate
court or child protection agency, and that every effort be made to con-
tinue treatment and maintain the infant's condition throughout the
process. 141
The ICRC and accompanying guidelines provide an effective
means to promote equal protection of handicapped infants by ensuring
improved conditions for decisionmaking as well as providing a de-
tached but passionate inquiry into the decisionmaking process. There-
fore, the final rules have provided an effective means to advance the
equal-treatment, nondiscrimination standards of section 504 towards
handicapped infants.
The ICRC and accompanying guidelines are not mandatory, how-
ever, but advisory. 142 Consequently, like the final rules' mandatory as-
pects, the recommended procedures cannot guarantee the equal
protection of handicapped infants. Health care providers may opt for
alternative review procedures or may establish an ICRC, but do so ac-
cording to their own guidelines.143 Admittedly, some health care prov-
to conform with the conception of social policy that since a child's life is at stake, reason
requires that his interests should prevail.
138. The shock of having a defective infant can overwhelm parents with grief, guilt, personal
blame, and hopelessness. See Fletcher, Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns, 2 HASTINGS
CENTER STUDIES 21 (1974). No sensitive person can fail to sympathize with the parents'
situation or can casually condemn their decision. Therefore, a "special advocate" can ensure
that the infant's interests are considered during these difficult times.
139. The standard of care in treating defective newborns is the provision of "medically beneficial"
treatment, as determined by "reasonable medical judgments," which cannot be withheld
solely because of the infant's present or anticipated physical or mental impairment. Final
Rule, supra note 63, at 1653. Consequently, the degrees of section 504 protection afforded to
handicapped newborns depends in part on the construction of "medically beneficial" treat-
ment and the allowable latitude of "reasonable medical judgments." See AMERICANS
UNITED FOR LIFE, SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF FINAL "BABY DOE" RULES WITH RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR ACTION 6-7 (1984). Therefore, the "special advocate" can advance section 504
protection by ensuring that medical judgments are not based upon the infant's present or
anticipated impairments.
140. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1653.
141. Id
142. Id. at 1652.
143. Once a particular review procedure is adopted, it will be difficult to assess whether the basis
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iders may implement procedures providing as much or more protection
to handicapped infants than the guidelines require. With no required
elements, however, nothing ensures that health care providers will im-
plement procedures that provide equal protection.
Since the final rules have shifted the responsibility of reviewing
treatment decisions to local entities, t'" the lack of any required guide-
lines will likely result in an extensive variation of review procedures
throughout the United States. In a nation comprised of diverse inter-
ests and beliefs,'45 this variation in review procedures does not guaran-
tee equal protection for defective infants. For example, if a hospital
should establish a review committee with no "special advocate,"' 14 6 the
handicapped infant has no guarantee that his or her rights and interests
will be fully considered,'47 that the reviewing body will not merely rub-
ber stamp the decisions of parents and physicians,148 or that any mem-
ber of the committee will even feel personally responsible for the
choices made. " Furthermore, since pediatricians frequently acquiesce
to parents' decisions refusing consent,150 a review committee consisting
primarily of pediatricians rather than a diverse membership will fail to
ensure that the handicapped infant's rights and interests are fully
considered.
Therefore, the final rules lack effective mandatory guidelines to en-
sure equal protection of handicapped infants in decisions to forego life-
sustaining treatment and in the procedures for review of these deci-
sions. The decisionmaking process can be emotional'' and filled with
conflicting interests 52 that overcome equal protection considerations.
Thus, the final rules do not effectively promote the equal treatment,
nondiscrimination standard of section 504.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Senate is currently considering a bill' 5 3 that spe-
for the reviewing body's decisionmaking is indeed medical indications or whether it involves
biased quality of life considerations.
144. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
145. For example, many views are espoused concerning the nature and extent of a handicapped
infant's rights. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Infant Doe, supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
149. See Annas, In re Quinlan: Legal Comfortfor Doctors, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 30-31
(1976).
150. For a list and explanation of surveys soliciting physicians' views on acqiescing, see PRESi-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 208.
151. See discussion, supra note 139.
152. For a review of these conflicting rights, see discussion supra note 36. See also Longino, supra
note 5, at 383-92.
153. See S. 1003, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S4284 (daily ed. April 7, 1983). Also, on
February 2, 1984, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REc. H878 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1983), to extend and improve the provisions of the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and
Adoption Reform Act of 1978. American Bar Association, Washington Summary, Jan. 30-
Feb.3, 1984, at 1, col. 1. The Act directs, inter alia, the HHS to establish guidelines for
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cifically incorporates protection of handicapped infants into the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act.' 5 4  The
bill would require studies of existing procedures and the legal, medical,
and ethical issues involved in treating defective infants, and would re-
quire that the Secretary of the HHS, based on these studies, recom-
mend procedures and regulations to deal with such situations.
The Secretary should encourage the statutory incorporation of the
HHS final rules 5' as amended by the following recommendations:15 6
1. mandate the use of "special advocates" in all review procedures;
2. establish the denial of medical treatment in a situation like the
Bloomington Infant Doe case as a violation of section 504; and
3. select medical consultants that support the HHS final rules.
First, mandating the use of "special advocates"' 57 in all review pro-
cedures furthers the policy and goal of the final rules. Special advo-
cates would ensure that the health care provider fully evaluates all
considerations favoring life-sustaining treatment. 158 Such a mandate
guarantees that at least one person reviewing the case feels personally
responsible for the decisions made and that the infant's rights and in-
terests are considered as thoroughly as other competing rights and
interests. 15 9
This recommendation does not constitute excessive federal inter-
vention. The final rules do not require the establishment of ICRC's in
order to grant health care providers flexibility to establish review pro-
cedures that are best-suited for themselves. 60 Since the use of special
advocates is the only requirement, this recommendation maintains flex-
ibility in establishing review procedures and does not promote exces-
sive federal interference with local health care.
Second, by specifically finding the medical situation in the Bloom-
advisory committees to provide advice on the care and treatment of seriously ill newborns.
Id
154. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, amended
by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-166, 92 Stat. 205; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357, 488-89 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (Supp. 11 1976)).
155. By adopting the HHS regulation within its bill, Congress will indirectly grant its approval of
HHS's interpretation of section 504. Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262
(1942). By approving HHS's interpretation of section 504, Congress will have provided the
congressional action which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals felt was lacking in United
States v. University Hospital, No. 83-6343. See discussion supra note 28. The author, how-
ever, agrees with the dissent in University Hospital, which stated, "[o]nce section 504's legisla-
tive heritage is acknowledged, the 'void' in the legislative history is eliminated and the many
issues raised by the defendants with regard to medical decisions, parental judgments, and
state authority simply evaporate." Id at 1941. By adopting HHS's regulation, Congress will
have protected handicapped infants' fairly won political victory.
156. These recommendations are suggested with the hope that the Federal Government continues
its protection of handicapped infants with increased concern for programs that aid parents
with the burdens and responsibilities of caring for these infants.
157. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
158. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1653.
159. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
160. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1624.
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ington Infant Doe case 16 1 violative of section 504, the HHS could
demonstrate its intent to enforce section 504 standards. Although the
Infant Doe decision is almost universally condemned,1 62 the final rules
fail to prohibit medical decisions in cases substantially similar to the
Infant Doe case. While the guidelines to the final rules condemn such
decisions, 163 the guidelines remain merely illustrative.' 64 Finding that
Infant Doe type medical decisions violate section 504 will further the
equal protection rights of infants while allowing continued case by case
analysis in other more severe cases.
This recommendation will also establish a minimum standard to
which all state child protection agencies will be held responsible. State
agencies which fail to challenge such a medical decision will be held to
have violated section 504.165 Such a standard is essential since, if sec-
tion 504 is held inapplicable to hospitals, 66 only state agencies would
be subject to this section.
Third, selecting medical consultants who support the final rules will
increase the rules' effectiveness. 67 Once notified of potential section
504 violations, an HHS medical consultant will review the health care
provider's report. Use of medical consultants who are indifferent or
opposed to the final rules fails to guarantee the rights of handicapped
infants. Therefore, the HHS Secretary should establish an advisory
committee,168 comprised of physicians nominated by organizations
committed to the implementation of the final rules, designed to recom-
mend medical consultants for each federal region. Only in that manner
can the rights of handicapped infants be guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
Achieving consistent decisions about withholding medical care
from handicapped infants is essential if these children are to receive
full equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution. Consistency
can only be achieved by either requiring that all defective infants be
medically treated or by allowing case by case analysis based on firm
161. See supra notes 9, 10 and accompanying text.
162. AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 139, at 10. For example, Dr. Harry Jenison, exec-
utive director of the American Academy of Pediatrics, stated: "[Tihe decision made in
Bloomington, Ind., was wrong .... No child should ever be denied treatment on the basis
that he is also retarded and handicapped." Chi. Tribune, Jan. 15, 1984, at E-l, col.4. The
President's Commission concluded that "the handicaps of Down's Syndrome . . . do not
justify failing to provide medically proven treatment, such as surgical correction of a blocked
intestinal tract." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 212.
163. Final Rule, supra note 63, at 1654.
164. Id at 1653.
165. The Monroe County Department of Public Welfare declined to appeal Infant Doe's case.
See discussion, supra note 12. The author suggests that this agency be cited for violating
section 504 to enhance the standard established by this recommendation.
166. See discussion supra notes 28, 112.
167. AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 139, at 12.
168. Such a committee could be established by legislation, Executive Order, or the HHS Secretary
pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 263-65 (1979).
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standards that ensure the full consideration of an infant's rights and
interests during the decisionmaking process. While the HHS has opted
for the latter alternative, it has failed to provide the necessary
mandatory guidelines to guarantee that equal protection considerations
enter the decisionmaking process.
Ironically, failure to ensure equal protection of handicapped infants
exists contemporaneously with society's desire to advance the rights
and respectability of handicapped individuals. Tolerating less than full
equal protection for defective infants makes folly of the rights accorded
all handicapped individuals. Until the rules assure that the rights and
interests of handicapped infants are fully represented in determining
whether to withhold treatment, the HHS final rules will not meet the
equal treatment, non-discrimination standard of section 504.
Todd W. Kingma*
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